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Resumen: A pesar de haber sido fuertemente derrotada a los comienzos de la década de 1990, Sendero 
Luminoso no desapareció. En los últimos cinco años, Sendero Luminoso ha resurgido de una forma 
sustancialmente diferente con un componente militar y político. La organización, una vez más 
coordinada por el líder Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, quien se encuentra en prisión, ha dejado de lado los 
objetivos militares a corto plazo para propiciar una estrategia a largo plazo consistente en reconstruir 
lentamente el apoyo popular y establecer un partido dentro del sistema político peruano. Para realizar 
esto, Sendero Luminoso ha mutado de una ideología Maoísta rígida y extrema hacia una posición más 
pragmática. El apoyo financiero se deriva una vez más de la producción y tráfico de la cocaína en el Valle 
Alto de Huallaga. Aunque pueda haber algunas excepciones individuales, Sendero Luminoso no es una 
organización narcoterrorista. Al mismo tiempo, Sendero es todavía una organización muy pequeña, 
dividida, y de ninguna manera significa una amenaza al Estado peruano. La organización política con 
base en Lima y el ala militar del Valle Alto de Huallaga continúan siguiendo el liderazgo de Guzmán, 
mientras que el grupo de los Valles Apurimac-Ene (VRAE) permanece comprometido a la lucha armada. 
La respuesta militar y civil del gobierno del Perú ha sido inadecuada. Las operaciones militares del VRAE 
son obstaculizadas por liderazgos pobres, tropas mal entrenadas y una estrategia desactualizada. El 
desarrollo de los recursos del VRAE ha sido recortado y la larga promesa de un camino “asfaltado”  
permanece en un estadio de planificación. Sin ajustes significativos del gobierno del Perú, Sendero 
Luminoso es probable que siga creciendo.    
 
Palabras clave: Perú, Sendero Luminoso, Maoísmo, Política de tráfico de droga, Políticas de 
contrainsurgencia, América Latina 
 
Abstract: Although soundly defeated in the early mid-1990s, Shining Path did not disappear. Over the 
past five years, it has reemerged in a substantially different form, with both a military and a political 
component. The organization, once again coordinated by jailed leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, has 
eschewed shorter-term military objectives in favor of a longer-term strategy of slowly rebuilding popular 
support and establishing a party within the Peruvian political system. In so doing, it has also moved from 
extreme Maoist ideological rigidity to a more pragmatic approach. Financial support is derived once 
again from cocaine production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Although there may 
be some individual exceptions, Shining Path is not a narcoterrorist organization. At the same time, 
Sendero is still very small, in no way a threat to the Peruvian state, and divided. The Lima-based political 
organization and the military wing in the UHV continue to follow Guzmán’s leadership, while the 
Apurímac-Ene Valleys (VRAE) group remains committed to the armed struggle. The GOP response to 
date, both military and civilian, has been inadequate. VRAE military operations are hampered by poor 
leadership, ill-trained troops, and an outdated strategy. VRAE development resources have been cut, 
and the long-promised paved road remains in the planning stage. Without significant GOP adjustments, 
Shining Path is likely to continue to grow. 
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This radical and largely home-grown Maoist guerrilla organization is back. It was the 
scourge of Peru in the 1980s and early 1990s2 before the government adopted a new 
counterinsurgency approach that successfully overcame the threat. Shining Path (Sendero, 
Sendero Luminoso, SL) is still a shadow of its former self and in no way represents a threat 
to the Peruvian state. However, the signs of its renewed presence in some parts of the 
country are unmistakable and a source of concern.  
 
For some years, it was widely believed that Sendero had, for all intents and purposes, 
disappeared. After all, SL’s maximum leader, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, was captured in a 
spectacular raid in September 1992. In addition, the organization had been progressively 
dismantled through cadre roundups, sympathizer rehabilitation, and rural micro-
development programs, among other initiatives.  
 
Such a view, however understandable, has proven to be premature. SL has in fact slowly 
regrouped over the past five years as the result of government indifference and 
incompetence, as well as due to revamped approaches by Sendero militant remnants and 
supporters of the group (Partlow 2008; Bryce 2009; Mendoza 2010). Terrorist actions have 
averaged over 100 per year during this period, and casualties among military, police, 
militants, and citizens have exceeded 300 (DIRCOTE 2010). In addition, the recently 
created political wing of SL, the Amnesty and Fundamental Rights Movement 
(MOVADEF), gathered over 150,000 signatures in an attempt to gain recognition as a 
political party for the 2010 local elections (Pérez 2010). 
                                                                 
1 David Scott Palmer is Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Boston University; 
Alberto Bolívar is a specialist on security and terrorism issues who teaches at the Centro de Altos Estudios 
Militares (CAEM) in Lima, Peru. 
2 Death and destruction figures during these years are sobering – 69,000 killed, 650,000 displaced, over one 
million emigrants, and some $24 billion in damaged infrastructure and productive capacity. The literature on 
this period is extensive; important analyses include Gorriti (1990), Degregori (1990), Tapia (1997), Coronel 
(1996), McClintock (1998), Palmer (1994), and Stern (1998). The definitive treatment is the nine-volume 









































II. Explaining Sendero´s Return 
 
The return of Sendero as a force to be reckoned with can be explained by considering 
several factors. A number of them relate to the guerrilla organization itself.  
 
One is the group’s return to its original Maoist-inspired goal of achieving power through an 
extended, long-term peoples’ war. In the aftermath of defeat, Guzmán and other surviving 
members of the leadership belatedly recognized that they were mistaken in concluding that 
they could achieve military victory quickly in the early 1990s. In spite of “objective 
conditions” favorable to the insurgents at the time, given a deep and extended economic 
decline and a severely weakened and discredited national government, Sendero leaders 
overlooked their own limitations as well as the shift in military and police 
counterinsurgency strategy then taking place (Palmer 2007: 208-213).  
 
A second is a shift in tactics to avoid some of the most serious mistakes of the past. 
Sendero Luminoso appears to have eschewed its earlier ideological rigidity. Over the course 
of the 1980s, such unwavering certainty led to an imposed organizational orthodoxy and 
repression on the presumptive beneficiaries of its radical Maoist-inspired revolution, the 
indigenous peasants themselves. It has turned instead to building constructive relationships 
with those local populations where it has a presence, as in the Apurímac-Ene (VRAE) and 
Upper Huallaga valleys where Víctor Quispe Palomino’s (aka José) “Proseguir” faction is 
operating3. Members now work the fields with peasants there, pay for needed supplies, and 
visit peasant communities to acknowledge past errors and to promise not to repeat them. 
They appear to have succeeded in rebranding themselves as a “kinder, gentler group…at 
least tacitly accepted by rural communities and by the very self-defense committees that 
played a pivotal role in the original SL’s defeat”(U.S. Embassy 2009a; Aronés 2010).  
 
Other militants are also present among potential allies, especially in some Lima and 
provincial universities (such as the University of San Marcos and the University of Callao in 
                                                                 
3 For additional details on this Proseguir faction, see the reports by London-based Peruvian journalist 
Fernando Lucena in the on-line publication IDL Reporteros (2011), which are based on interviews in the 









































the capital, and the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga – UNSCH, in Ayacucho, 
where Sendero originated in the 1960s) and in regional defense fronts (Bolívar, 2010; 
García Blásquez, 2010). These latter groups were originally set up by local organizations, 
usually leftist in orientation, to advance their interests and to pressure regional and 
municipal governments through protest marches and occasional attacks on government 
buildings to secure responses to their demands.  
 
A third is the return to past practices which had proved to be successful, such as the 
organization and expansion of armed cadre for selective attacks on government forces in 
areas where Sendero holds the advantage of intimate knowledge of local terrain, particularly 
in its jungle redoubts in the Apurímac-Ene (VRAE) and Upper Huallaga river valleys. A 
related component that builds on past successes is a return to the generation of resources 
through drug production and trafficking, including guarding “mules” transporting cocaine 
from the jungle across the sierra to coastal gathering points for shipment. These resources, 
as in the late 1980s, provide the means to obtain weapons, to pay for supplies, and to 
support cadres and their operations4 (Romero 2009; Whalen 2010; INFOREGIÓN 2011). 
 
A fourth factor in the regeneration of some level of organizational capacity and central 
direction is the ability in recent years of Sendero’s jailed chief, Abimael Guzmán, to 
communicate with supporters in the field. This enables the organization’s founder to 
provide ideological, strategic, and tactical guidance and to reestablish a sense of 
organizational coherence, at least among those who continue to see him as their maximum 
leader.  
 
Guzmán has been able to do so as the result of prison policy changes instituted by the 
Valentín Paniagua transitional government (2000-2001) and his successor, Alejandro 
Toledo (2001-2006), changes that have continued under President Alan García Pérez 
(2006-2011). These shifts responded to pressures by the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission (IAHRC) to institute a more humane approach to the incarcerated as well as a 
                                                                 
4 There is a view, subscribed to by some Peruvian and other analysts and many Peruvian government officials, 
that Shining Path has become a narcoterrorist organization, similar to the FARC in Colombia, which has lost 
its ideological orientation and is now little more than a drug trafficking organization. The authors do not 









































desire by these successive elected governments to demonstrate their democratic bona fides 
after the increasingly authoritarian policies of the Alberto Fujimori government (1990-
2000) (Bolívar 2002; Potestá 2002; Gonzales 2003; EFE 2003; Jiménez 2003). 
 
Shining Path’s expanding presence and growing capacity also relate to the generally 
ineffective government policies in recent years. Once the imminent threat posed by 
Sendero had passed with the defeat and disarticulation of the organization and most of its 
leadership either dead or in jail, successive administrations have moved on to other 
concerns.  
 
The specialized police group (GEIN) that tracked guerrilla leaders and was responsible for 
their capture was disbanded and absorbed into the National Intelligence Service (SIN). 
DINCOTE, now DIRCOTE, charged with gathering information on internal threats, 
entered into reorganization between 1992 and 1994 and no longer has the operational 
capacity of earlier years (El Comercio 1994).  
 
In addition, the extremely successful rural micro-development programs established by the 
now discredited Fujimori government in the early 1990s were either ended or changed in 
ways that no longer responded to specific articulated local needs5. These programs were 
targeted at the 200 poorest districts of the country, often in areas where Shining Path had 
been most active. Between 1993 and 1998, they significantly reduced poverty with small-
scale programs selected and overseen by elected members of the community while 
simultaneously establishing an effective government presence (Palmer 2001).  
 
An economic initiative to provide resources for access road paving and development of the 
river valleys and adjacent areas of the VRAE has languished. This is in spite of the fact that 
the region is both a major source of coca production and a haven for many of the 
remaining armed SL militants. Although declared to be a high priority by successive 
                                                                 
5 For example, in 2007-2008 President Alan García Pérez reduced the budget, centralized operations, and 
changed the mission of one of the most successful of the microdevelopment  organizations, the Fondo 
Nacional de Cooperación de Desarrollo Social (FONCODES) to provide larger rural development programs 









































governments, the road has still not been paved to enable local farmers to export their legal 
crops6. In a quite inexplicable decision the García administration actually reduced by over 
15 percent Fiscal Year 2011 funding for the VRAE development initiative (ANDINA 
2009; La Voz de Huamanga 2010; El Comercio 2011).   
 
Furthermore, when the military responded to increased Shining Path activity in the area in 
2009 with a major initiative (Operación Excelencia), it repeated mistakes of the 1980s by 
emphasizing military operations over a “hearts and minds” civic action campaign and lost 
two helicopters and over 50 troops, mostly conscripts. In spite of a lack of success, military 
forces continue to operate in close proximity to fixed bases and do not mingle or work 
with local civilian populations. Conscripts rather than Special Forces continue to comprise 
the troops in the VRAE, and a general sent to command the military there in 2009 had no 
prior experience in counterinsurgency operations (Bolívar 2009). 
 
Such a set of continuing ineffective, even counterproductive official responses suggest that 
central government has once again underestimated Sendero’s modest but growing 
operational capacity. What might explain a policy of giving a low priority to a reemerging 
problem that at one point in the early 1990s threatened to overwhelm the state itself?  
                                                                 
6 There is a parallel here to what U.S. officials in Afghanistan realize is needed to improve their non-military 
efforts against insurgents. “You can drill a well in a day, and build a school in a month… but it takes a long, 
long time to build a road. When you start a road, you send a message that it isn’t a month-long partnership – 










































III.  Explaining Government´s Ineffective Responses 
 
One part of the answer might lie, as during much of the 1980s, with the absence of any 
perceived threat to Lima, Peru’s capital, residence of one-third of the country’s population 
and well over half of its economic activity. Most analysts believe that it was Guzmán’s 
decision to take the people’s war to Lima in the late 1980s that galvanized government and 
the military to finally make the major changes in their counterinsurgency strategy which 
eventually produced success against the guerrilla forces. Violence at that time peaked in 
1992 with over 60 car bombs. With the last such attack occurring in Lima almost eight 
years ago7, the sense of urgency, even desperation, so pervasive in the capital in the early 
1990s is absent today.  
 
A second part of the explanation can be found in the now outdated counterinsurgency 
approach that continues to be based on the military strategy developed in 1989 rather than 
a new plan that adopts tactics more responsive to the changes Sendero has made in the 
course of its reemergence since 20068. According to SL analyst Rubén Vargas, the 
government has forgotten that to defeat the guerrillas in the VRAE it must first focus on a 
counter-narcotics strategy, since the VRAE is where most of Peru’s cocaine is now 
produced, and then deal with the insurgents themselves. For such an approach, the military 
must have the local population and local authorities as allies and must send personnel who 
both know the local combat scenario and have experience in irregular warfare (Pérez 2010). 
A coherent plan that takes these issues into account would replace the mostly young and 
inexperienced troops now being sent with older veterans and experienced commanding 
officers. It would also emphasize military and civilian civic action activities in close 
consultation with the local populations. In addition, a much higher priority would be given 
to infrastructure development in the VRAE, including roads, schools, and health clinics. 
 
                                                                 
7 This was a car bomb that was set off in the El Polo mall, one block from the U.S. Embassy in Lima, on 
March 20, 2002, just two days before President George W. Bush’s arrival in Lima. Eleven people were killed. 
8 DIRCOTE (Dirección Contra el Terrorismo) figures on the number of “terrorist actions” carried out by 
Shining Path in its three areas of operations, the VRAE, Upper Huallaga, and Lima, show 175 in 2006, 72 in 
2007, 76 in 2008, 102 in 2009, and 136 in 2010. From charts provided by DIRCOTE to Alberto Bolívar, 









































A third element relates to human rights issues in a number of different ways. Military 
personnel in the field report that they feel hamstrung by fears that any operations they 
carry out will be criticized by human rights groups, so they respond by limiting their 
activities and keeping their patrols close to their bases (Bolívar 2010). Such a response in 
the field certainly affects the ability of troops to succeed with their assigned mission, 
although, as noted just above, the lack of an effective and coherent strategy at present also 
seems to be part of the problem.  
 
At the same time, the expressed concerns over human rights issues related to current army 
operations in the VRAE, whether justified or not, have a historical basis in abuses 
committed by both sides during the government’s struggle to overcome the ravages of 
Sendero’s people’s war between 1982 and the early 1990s.  The Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (2002-2004) documented over 2000 mass graves in Ayacucho 
alone. (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación – CVR 2003) Subsequently, forensic teams, 
government prosecutors, and non-governmental groups have uncovered evidence of 
military massacres and mass burials in Ayacucho in the 1980s in such indigenous 
communities as Putis and within the walls of the Cabitos army base (Palmer 2008).   
 
These efforts to address the consequences of the insurgency and to find ways to help local 
survivors to come to terms with their family members’ deaths have run up against a less 
than enthusiastic response by central government. This includes restrictions on forensic 
teams, replacement of government prosecutors seen as “overly aggressive” in pursuing 
human rights abuses, and court cases moved to Lima from Ayacucho. It is also the case 
that very few individual reparations payments have been made by the government as yet 
even though the law requires such payments to survivors of war victims as a key element of 
the reconciliation process. In a most welcome if overdue development, the government did 
distribute $5,000,000 in 2010 in one-time $50,000 payments to peasant communities 
affected by the violence throughout the sierra. However, the limitations imposed on 
uncovering forensic evidence and on the judicial process have impeded progress on some 
14,000 to 15,000 individual claims (Coronel 2010). 
 
One explanation offered for such a halfhearted approach, either to full application of the 









































President García’s fears of possible prosecution for actions that occurred during his first 
presidency (1985-1990).  Like ex-President Fujimori before him, who was extradited from 
Chile, tried, and convicted during his current mandate, the view is that García worries that 
he, too, might be held accountable for human rights abuses during his first term. Several of 
the mass killings in the sierra, as well as the death of almost 300 Sendero prisoners at the 
hands of the Republican Guards after an uprising in the El Frontón prison in 1986, are 
potential swords of Damocles hanging over his head. Such considerations may well be 
affecting his decisions on such issues (Coronel: 2010).       
 
Finally, similar concerns are expressed over the progressive release from prison since 2000 
of almost 4,000 convicted insurgents who have completed their sentences, without any 
follow-up tracking policy. Official denials notwithstanding, there is ample evidence that 
some of those freed have returned to participate in Shining Path activities9.  
                                                                 
9 Periodic newspaper accounts relate apprehensions in Lima and several provinces of convicted SL militants 









































IV.  Explaining Sendero´s Limitations 
 
In spite of such discouraging signs of ineffectiveness in the government’s response to the 
newly energized activities of Shining Path, the Upper Huallaga valley, where the police are 
in charge of eliminating the guerrilla threat, does show signs of progress. Here Florindo 
Flores Hala (aka Artemio), the lone member of Shining Path’s Central Committee still at 
large, is in charge of operations designed to reestablish support among local peasants, 
largely coca growers, while at the same time gathering revenues from the production and 
trafficking of cocaine to support Sendero operations. Over the past year or so, the same 
police who successfully tracked and captured Guzmán in 1992 have headed operations in 
the valley and have rounded up or killed several of the key subordinates of Artemio. In 
fact, they have also come very close to bringing in Artemio himself. These police-directed 
operations in the Upper Huallaga demonstrate that it is indeed possible to pursue a 
successful counterinsurgency strategy against the armed remnants of Shining Path. In so 
doing, they place into sharp relief the contrasting failed efforts of the military to do the 
same in the VRAE (Gorriti 2010). 
 
Beyond Shining Path’s current challenges in the Upper Huallaga, there are other issues in 
play that limit its ability to pursue the once more long-term objective of eventual accession 
to power through the people’s war. The organization, while more coordinated than it has 
been in some years by the ability of Abimael Guzmán to communicate with militants in the 
field, is itself divided. These divisions go back more than fifteen years, to 1993, when 
Guzmán acknowledged military defeat and asked for a peace agreement. This decision 
produced a break between militants who accepted his conclusion and those who vowed to 
continue the armed struggle unabated.  This tension between Sendero remnants has 
continued over the years. With increased activity by militants and sympathizers, however, it 
is now more visible to the outsider. 
 
At this time, there are three distinct groups of Shining Path supporters. The Lima 
contingent is led by chief spokesperson Alfredo Crespo, Guzmán’s lead lawyer, along with 
legal colleague Manuel Fajardo, and engages in efforts to free militants still in jail, a general 









































Upper Huallaga group is led by Artemio, and includes “Rubén” and a number of others 
known only by their aliases. The VRAE organization is led by José, with other principal 
figures including Orlando Alejandro Borda Casafranca, aka Alipio, Jorge Quispe Palomino, 
aka Raúl (José’s brother), Rolando Cabezas Figueroa, aka Guillermo, and several more also 
known only by their aliases.  
 
The first two continue to accept Guzmán’s leadership and guidance in emphasizing a 
political solution in the shorter term, including a general amnesty. However, the guerrillas 
in the VRAE reject his leadership in favor of a military solution in the context of the 
ongoing armed struggle, and have demonstrated their disdain by sentencing Guzmán to 
death (VRAE Facción 2008). Recent evidence of what might have started out as efforts to 
bridge the gap between the two armed wings (estimated together to total about 450 armed 
militants), with leaders who worked closely together at one time but are now antagonists, 
indicates that these efforts failed completely. When José sent Félix Huachaca Tincopa, aka 
Roberto, to the Upper Huallaga in February 2010 to make contact with Artemio and 
coordinate actions, his offer was refused. José then instructed Roberto to kill Artemio, but 









































V. Legal Recognition: A New Path for Sendero?  
 
The Lima-based Shining Path supporters, following a very different course in their peaceful 
pursuit of a set of citizen front organizations, have had some success in regenerating 
relationships with sympathizers in several Lima and sierra universities, unions, and regional 
defense groups. They have also organized marches and protests in favor of granting a 
general amnesty which would include both Guzmán and, ironically, Fujimori and military 
offenders as well. The concomitant efforts of their lawyers’ organization to register a 
political party sympathetic to the group’s causes have failed, however, at least for now.  
 
The hope was to gain legal recognition for the Amnesty and Fundamental Rights 
Movement (MOVADEF) to be able to participate in the April 2011 elections. Although 
organizers gathered more than the requisite 150,000 signatures, these were deemed to have 
been submitted too close to the registration deadline for verification. Even so, the group’s 
ability to garner that number of citizens at least willing to let a Shining Path-sympathizing 
party appear on the ballot (assuming most of the signatures are genuine) may suggest that 
the non-violent approach is gaining traction.  
 
Such support is suggested by MOVADEF’s first congress, organized in November 2010 to 
begin the process of collecting sufficient signatures to register as a political party. The 
gathering was attended by more than 200 delegates from several Lima lower class districts, 
including Villa El Salvador, San Juan de Miraflores, San Juan de Lurigancho, 
Independencia, and Comas. There were also representatives from the departments of 
Puno, Ancash, Arequipa, Ayacucho, Apurímac, Junín, Tumbes, and Piura, as well as from 
the public universities of San Marcos and Callao (Pérez 2010: 5). 
 
MOVADEF has also carried out a number of legal initiatives in what has turned out to be 
a successful effort to free from jail several hundred former cadres of Sendero and the now 
defunct Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) (Yovera 2009). DIRCOTE 
sources have registered their concerns that those freed failed to pay the civil reparations 










































The armed faction of Shining Path based in the coca-rich Upper Huallaga valley (UHV), 
whose leader Artemio continues to adhere to “Gonzalo (i.e., Guzmán) thought” and to 
accept his prison-based guidance, is under constant harassment by police forces. Several 
important Sendero lieutenants in the valley have been rounded up in recent months, 
though Artemio continues to elude capture.  
 
Even so, there is evidence of some level of continuing support for the group by local 
farmers, one of its prime objectives, as well as of resources for the organization generated 
by revenues from drug production and trafficking. These resources are crucial to Shining 
Path’s continued efforts to rebuild both the armed and popular support generating 
components of the organization. There is no question that police operations in the UHV 
threaten the finances that currently undergird the pro-Guzmán segments of Sendero; their 
continued success in the valley, whether they capture Artemio or not, would be a major 
blow to the organization.  
 
The segment of Shining Path based in the VRAE, which is roundly opposed to the 
strategic assessment and tactical line pursued by its once dominant head, is at this moment 
in a much better position to advance the approach the militants have been following for at 
least the past five years. This includes close collaboration with the local population by some 
members (U.S. Embassy 2009b). At the same time, others, making up the armed cadre, 
attack army patrols and bases and protect carriers of cocaine on roads and trails out of the 
valleys over the sierra to the coast (Libón 2011).  
 
The difficult jungle terrain is one major handicap for government forces, while limitations 
of leadership and the counterinsurgency approach adopted, as well as the lack of central 
authority priority further limit their success. At the same time, the Sendero cadre in the 
VRAE, while still ascendant there, do not appear at this juncture to be moving very far 










































VI.  Conclusions 
 
Our assessment of the future dynamics of Shining Path is that the organization, or more 
correctly, the organizations, is at a crossroads. Both the dissident branch continuing the 
armed struggle in the VRAE and the group based in Lima that is focusing on gaining 
popular support and filling political space on the left are slowly gaining momentum. This 
ideological and tactical split certainly weakens Sendero’s overall ability to advance. In 
addition, the capacity of the Guzmán- supporting armed wing of SL in the UHV is 
declining, and the dissident Proseguir faction in the VRAE still seems to be limited in its 
range of operations beyond the jungle valleys. One possibility that could emerge from these 
current dynamics, given the advances made by MOVADEF in trying to enter the national, 
regional, and local political arenas, is a slowly progressing Shining Path mutation that in 
time finds a legitimate place within Peru’s national political system.  
 
As our analysis has suggested, government’s response is a key consideration in any 
assessment of Shining Path’s future. So far, its actions have indicated that it is not yet 
prepared to provide the necessary overall response that would eliminate the latent threat 
the group poses, so it could easily continue to grow. At the same time, Sendero’s repressive 
history among the very peasant groups it is now trying to work with to regain support is 
likely to limit any expansion, especially in the central-south sierra in and around Ayacucho.  
 
For the government, its successes in the UHV demonstrate that the guerrilla threat can be 
reduced. Even so central government authorities are not yet willing to refine their response 
to an emerging within-system Shining Path presence and cannot yet see the potential 
benefits that allowing the organization to operate as a political party might bring. Public 
opinion is also overwhelmingly opposed to any legalization of Sendero’s political front. 
Even though the national SL party possibility is off the table for the 2011 national 
elections, it is very likely that Sendero-sympathizing political groups or alliances will be 
involved in local and regional elections and will have some success. As far as the military 
side of SL is concerned, the continuation of low level and regionally delimited insurgency is 









































this time is that Shining Path will continue a slow expansion of its political wing but is 
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